

Date

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL**

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date																		
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<table border="1"><tr><td>Action</td><td>File</td><td>Note and Return</td></tr><tr><td>Approval</td><td>For Clearance</td><td>Per Conversation</td></tr><tr><td>As Requested</td><td>For Correction</td><td>Prepare Reply</td></tr><tr><td>Circulate</td><td>For Your Information</td><td>See Me</td></tr><tr><td>Comment</td><td>Investigate</td><td>Signature</td></tr><tr><td>Coordination</td><td>Justify</td><td></td></tr></table>				Action	File	Note and Return	Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation	As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply	Circulate	For Your Information	See Me	Comment	Investigate	Signature	Coordination	Justify	
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As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply																			
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Coordination	Justify																				

**REMARKS**

Please distribute:  
to SEB per DD/DM  
to me for PER SUB  
to SAG if you think appropriate.  
to you if you want.

DONE 17 apr 88.

25X1

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,  
clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
<i>CJ PBC</i>	
	Phone No.

5041-102

\* GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

CONFIDENTIAL

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Project Slammer

FROM		EXTENSION 5311	NO.	25X1	
			DATE 17 April 1985		
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DD/PSI Attn: SAG					Attached for your information is a copy of material provided by SECOM regarding the composition and duties of the working group for Project Slammer.
2.					
3. C/PPG					
4.					
5. C/SEG					
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25X1

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

\*SECOM-D-110

12 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:  STAT  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Project Slammer

Attached for your information is a copy of material provided by  STAT  
 concerning the composition and duties of the working group for Project  STAT  
Slammer.

Attachment: a/s

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STAT



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330-5110

8 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, DCI SECOM (Robert E. Leidenheimer)

SUBJECT: Project Slammer

1. Dr Hibler had planned for me to pass the attached to you at the 3 Apr 85 SECOM meeting. Due to the normal delay in the administrative delivery, I received it after our SECOM meeting.

2. The attach provides clarification of the Project Slammer Working Group and, hopefully, will answer any of your remaining questions.

*Robert B. Huey, Jr.*  
ROBERT B. HUEY, Jr., Colonel, USAF  
USAF Member  
DCI Security Committee

1 Atch  
AFOSI/IVSB Ltr, 2 Apr 85  
w/1 Atch

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS  
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332-6001

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

IVSB (767-5287)

2 April 1985

SUBJECT: Response to SECOM Tasking

TO: AFIS (Col Robert Huey)  
Room BD951  
The Pentagon

1. Reference page 3, SECOM Minutes, 14 Mar 85.
2. Attached please find a brief statement in response to the 14 March 85 SECOM request for clarification of Project Slammer "Working Group",
3. Please also be advised that I am in the process of contacting the 12 recent symposium participants who indicated interest in working on "Slammer". Per my discussion with [REDACTED] (SECOM), it appears that only those with SI clearance will be able to participate at this time due to the administrative difficulties in obtaining interim access. Those who have an SI clearance will comprise the "Working Group".
4. Further, to maximize the momentum of this recent symposium, a working group meeting has been set for 30 April and 1 May. SECOM is to provide a location for this meeting.
5. SECOM has been advised that I have met with FBI supervisory Special Agent Richard Ault and Dr. Joseph Kroccheck. Both are personally committed to the project, yet each will require further coordination. A letter will be forthcoming from SECOM to FBI to request SA Ault, and Dr. Kroccheck will initiate his own contact with SECOM for contracting his services.
6. Please pass along the enclosed response at the 3 April SECOM meeting. It is my understanding that SECOM will make such announcements as are necessary regarding the other issues I have mentioned.

NEIL S. HIBLER, Major, USAF, BSC  
Command Clinical Psychologist  
Directorate of Investigative Support

Atch  
Memo for SECOM

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

"HELPING TO PROTECT A GREAT WAY OF LIFE"

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECOM

2 April 1985

Subject: Response to SECOM Request for Clarification of Project "Slammer" Working Group

1. Reference page 3, SECOM Minutes, 14 March 1985
2. Two groups have been identified for this project (Atch 1). One, the investigative team, will actually conduct the interviews. The other is a "working group" which will include the "team" and a larger group of consultants. This larger body will convene before the 1st case interview to aid in developing specific guidelines and later, to help analyze data and refine interview procedures for use in following cases. Finally, the working group will be of great assistance in reviewing the results of the five cases, which will initiate this study so that a report may be issued. This report will summarize findings, further refine procedure - and in so doing give clear direction for the selection and research of further cases.
3. The working group is a multi-disciplinary body, comprised of clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, counterintelligence specialists and personnel experts. Importantly, this group also represents the many agencies which comprise the Security Committee. At present, some 15 attendees of the recent SECOM Behavioral Science Symposium (to include the investigative team), have asked to participate. At this time each is being contacted by the project leader to confirm their level of security clearance and their availability to meet 30 April and 1 May. This meeting will constitute the first working group session.
4. The goals of this session are to develop specific protocols for interviews of subjects and observers (intimates of subject, and closest co-worker/supervisor) and to prescribe a psychological testing battery. Subject interviews will include two basic areas: a developmental history, and the subject's perceptions regarding how/why they became involved in their crimes. The protocol for observers will offer other perspectives regarding subjects state before/during the period of criminal activity, and aid in validating subject's remarks. Also, psychological testing will be helpful in describing subject's current emotional status, and will initiate a data base from which stable at risk characteristics may be considered. Test selected by the working group will include, but not be limited to instruments employed in applicant screening in the intelligence community.d
5. Finally, summaries of cases nominated for this research by member SECOM agencies will be reviewed. From these a selection will be made so that arrangements for the first interview can follow. Once it is established that the first subject has been contacted, and has consented to interview, the team (Dr. Hibler, Dr. Korfcheck and Supervisory Special Agent Ault) will conduct an in-depth case review and schedule the subject and observer interviews.

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6. Following completion of the first case, the working group will again confer to discuss results and refine the procedure for following cases. At the conclusion of the fifth case, another working group session will be held for data analysis, the compilation of a report, further development of procedure, and the selection of cases for continuing research.

*Neil S. HIBLER*

NEIL S. HIBLER, Major, USAF, BSC  
Command Clinical Psychologist  
Directorate of Investigative Support

Atch  
Research Proposal

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Project "Slammer" Research ProposalUNDERSTANDING ESPIONAGE: SUBJECTS' OWN PERSPECTIVES  
AND CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES

BACKGROUND: Previous espionage research regarding which has considered "human factors," has concentrated on the personal dynamics of those who commit this crime. Much of this work has been in the form of the single case study, or involved the similarities found among several cases which were studied individually. Information for these studies has predominantly been drawn from case file data, which included historical material, personnel records and the results of substantive investigations. Actually, this has been the traditional methodology for examining criminal behavior in general, and this is but an application of the technique to the crime of espionage.

Recent initiatives developed by members of the FBI Behavioral Science Unit suggest a practical, innovative methodology. This approach asks the offenders themselves about their crimes. It has, for instance, provided numerous insights into the motivations and methods of serial murderers. Direct inquiry of subjects, however, may not always be successful. Some incarcerated felons have no desire to cooperate, while others may provide information which is intentionally misleading. Nonetheless, many do participate. Apparently the opportunity to aid in research reinforces their self-esteem, assuages guilt, or both.

Another innovation is suggested by the psychologists who conduct entrance screening at CIA. Their astute observation is that environmental/situational factors appear to be distinct influences upon a number of spies who were otherwise (psychologically) unremarkable when compared to their peers. These situations are "triggers" which are perceived by subjects to justify illegal behavior. It would seem that this interaction of personality factors and life circumstances produces a compelling sense of entitlement which motivates espionage. Apparently the key to understanding this motivation lies in subjects' personal perceptions of their experiences. It would then seem to follow, that the FBI's direct approach would be essential to unlocking the importance of contextual issues which have catalytic effects.

The most obvious potential shortcoming of the direct interview approach questions the validity of the information provided by incarcerated felons. While it may not be possible to resolve the veracity of all data, interviews of subjects' closest associates at the time of the offense could be telling. Spouses, lady-friends or men-friends may be able to validate and amplify subjects' statements. Further, co-workers could reveal information that would provide insights into conditions in the work place. For instance, peers in the work place may be able to describe presumptions about the subject they entertained during the period that the crimes occurred. This final observation may identify barriers perceived by employees to reporting possible security concerns.

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STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: This study will examine espionage agents by exploring the many interactive contextual factors which spies themselves believe to have influenced their motivation. In the past, most espionage research has viewed subjects externally to form descriptive personality assessments. Information has not been obtained directly from subjects to offer their own perspectives. Consequently, this study will focus on spies' own thoughts, feelings and beliefs regarding their decision to commit espionage, presumptions regarding detection, and their reactions to the potential consequences of their acts. Further, this study will refine a methodology for continuing inquiry into the crime of espionage.

Delineated Goals:

1. Increase our understanding of subjects who have committed espionage to enhance future security screening.
2. Detail situational circumstances that may have influenced the act of espionage.
3. Examine system effects that may have diluted or impeded the maintenance of security.
4. Develop a procedure to continually collect and analyze behavioral science aspects of espionage.

METHOD

Cases: Cases to be studied, to the greatest extent possible, need be representative of typical instances of the crime. This is so that results will be generalizable to the most frequently encountered circumstances. Sensational cases, which are noteworthy only because of their notoriety, may occur only rarely, thereby limiting their potential for prediction. Further, cases need to be reasonably recent. Very old cases will potentially suffer from a lack of uniformity to current conditions, not to mention the influences of time on memory. The sample also should represent community-wide investigations, so that idiosyncratic differences within agencies do not distort conclusions. Member agencies of SECOM will nominate cases by presenting summaries to the project working group, which will select cases for study. Detailed case review will precede each subject interview.

Subjects: All personnel who are subjects of this study will be spies who have been caught, tried and convicted; they need to have been fully adjudicated. Further, these felons must have exhausted all appeals and be serving their sentences free of any further legal redress. To confirm the purpose of this study, and to more fully assist in cooperation, each subject must be authorized immunity from further prosecution for their offense. Additionally, others who volunteer to participate as observers of the subject (while in commission of the crime) should be offered both immunity and anonymity.

Data Collection: All subjects will be interviewed to obtain detailed historical data regarding their maturational development. This history will explore the nature of relationships, the engendering of loyalty and effects of critical incidents. Psychological testing will be conducted to obtain

objective measures of current functioning, to include personality traits and dispositions. These assessments will also permit comparisons to earlier psychometric findings (where available) to provide an index of change from entrance security screening. Interviews will be videotape recorded to enhance review and permit refinement of procedure.

**Procedure:** This research will be conducted in three phases. Phase one will consist of a pilot study to develop technique, both in content and style. Phase two will comprise a series of four subject interviews. This phase will be a preliminary evaluation of progress based on an arbitrarily small number of cases. It will permit further procedural refinement while allowing for initial analyses as a check for the utility of the data. The third phase will consist of continuing interviews so that a data base can be established, procedure can be modified for greater relevance, and cases themselves can have more thorough conclusions. In summary, the procedures are intended to be self refining, and in time, permit a course of action to more fully resolve each case examined (e.g., to provide further insights to include possibly revising assessments of information compromised). Eventually, all adjudicated cases could be considered for behavioral science review, providing an on-going source of research and investigation. Figure 1 depicts the procedural overview.

#### Projected Deadlines

	<u>4 Months</u>	<u>7 Months</u>	<u>Continual</u>
Phase I	Pilot Study (1 case)		
Phase II		Preliminary Study (4 cases)	
Phase III			On-Going Study (Reporting at 6 month intervals)

FIGURE 1. PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

Figure 1 also presents suggested deadlines for accomplishing goals. While these deadlines are only approximate, they are offered to shape expectations for reporting. Initiation of Phase I will, of course, require a number of supportive actions.

REQUIREMENTS FOR INITIATING RESEARCH

**Personnel:** It is proposed that personnel to support this study be formally appointed as either research team members (who will actually conduct the interviews) or to the project working group. Team members should be consistent throughout Phases I and II. By the time Phase III is initiated, procedures should be sufficiently standardized that individual roles could be conducted by others. The team should be small in size to facilitate interaction, aid standardization and intensify the learning experience. It ought to consist of two behavioral scientists, and two security investigators. One of the behavioral scientists will be the project leader; one of the security experts will function administratively as a point of contact and expeditor for the many "behind the scenes" actions and coordinations. Additionally, there should be clerical support, preferably from the same office as the security agent who acts as functional administrator. Importantly, in addition to being multidisciplinary, the team and working group should have multiagency representation.

Consultants to the team will comprise a working group. Resources will include additional behavioral scientists, security, legal, and data automation personnel. Consultants will attend an initial planning session to develop structured interview content and format, design preliminary data analysis procedures, and select an initial case for study. Results of this first working group meeting will be refined by the team and tested in the subsequent pilot study (Phase I of the project). The working group will then again meet to review salient videotaped portions of interviews, discuss findings and restructure the procedure as appropriate. Phase II would then follow, with an additional working group meeting to be held to select additional cases. The working groups may also be convened prior to reporting Phase II findings. Phase III presumes sufficient refinement of procedure to preclude the need for routine scheduling for working group assistance.

**Coordination:** In addition to making team and working group selection, there will be requirements for a variety of essential arrangements. These will include scheduling and arranging meetings, nominating cases for study, obtaining grants of immunity (and authorization for anonymity of subjects's associates), contacting prospective subjects to determine their voluntariness, and arranging for interviews of subjects and their former associates.

**Equipment:** Psychological testing materials and videotaping equipment are the only items required. Access to word processing and minicomputers for data analysis is also necessary.

**Funds:** The primary expenditure is anticipated to arise from travel expenses required for meetings and interviews. Additional costs may be incurred if members of the team or working group are contractual employees. Further, consideration ought to be given to compensating subjects' former associates for their time if they are not in governmental employment. Due to the variability of these factors, an estimate of expenses is difficult. Nonetheless, Phase I would be expected to cost approximately ten thousand dollars and Phase II, twenty-five thousand dollars. More precise estimates per interview for Phase III should be established by completion of Phase II. The first year of this study is therefore estimated to cost approximately 35 thousand dollars.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

\*SECOM-D-110

12 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

STAT

Chairman

SUBJECT: Project Slammer

Attached for your information is a copy of material provided by Maj. Hibler concerning the composition and duties of the working group for Project Slammer.

STAT

Attachment: a/s

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STAT



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE.  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330-5110

8 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, DCI SECOP

STAT

SUBJECT: Project Slammer

1. Dr Hibler had planned for me to pass the attached to you at the 3 Apr 85 SECOP meeting. Due to the normal delay in the administrative delivery, I received it after our SECOP meeting.

2. The attach provides clarification of the Project Slammer Working Group and, hopefully, will answer any of your remaining questions.

ROBERT B. HUEY, Jr., Colonel, USAF  
USAF Member  
DCI Security Committee

1 Atch  
AFOSI/IVSB Ltr, 2 Apr 85  
w/1 Atch

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS  
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332-8001

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: IVSB (767-5287)

2 April 1985

SUBJECT: Response to SECOM Tasking

TO: AFIS (Col Robert Huey)  
Room BD951  
The Pentagon

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2. Attached please find a brief statement in response to the 14 March 85 SECOM request for clarification of Project Slammer "Working Group",
3. Please also be advised that I am in the process of contacting the 12 recent symposium participants who indicated interest in working on "Slammer". Per my discussion with [REDACTED] (SECOM), it appears that only those with SI clearance will be able to participate at this time due to the administrative difficulties in obtaining interim access. Those who have an SI clearance will comprise the "Working Group".
4. Further, to maximize the momentum of this recent symposium, a working group meeting has been set for 30 April and 1 May. SECOM is to provide a location for this meeting.
5. SECOM has been advised that I have met with FBI supervisory Special Agent Richard Ault and Dr. Joseph Kroccheck. Both are personally committed to the project, yet each will require further coordination. A letter will be forthcoming from SECOM to FBI to request SA Ault, and Dr. Kroccheck will initiate his own contact with SECOM for contracting his services.
6. Please pass along the enclosed response at the 3 April SECOM meeting. It is my understanding that SECOM will make such announcements as are necessary regarding the other issues I have mentioned.

STAT

*Neil S. Hibler*  
NEIL S. HIBLER, Major, USAF, BSC  
Command Clinical Psychologist  
Directorate of Investigative Support

Atch  
Memo for SECOM

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

"HELPING TO PROTECT A GREAT WAY OF LIFE"

MEMORANDUM FOR SECOM

2 April 1985

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2. Two groups have been identified for this project (Atch 1). One, the investigative team, will actually conduct the interviews. The other is a "working group" which will include the "team" and a larger group of consultants. This larger body will convene before the 1st case interview to aid in developing specific guidelines and later, to help analyze data and refine interview procedures for use in following cases. Finally, the working group will be of great assistance in reviewing the results of the five cases, which will initiate this study so that a report may be issued. This report will summarize findings, further refine procedure - and in so doing give clear direction for the selection and research of further cases.
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*Neil S. HIBLER*

NEIL S. HIBLER, Major, USAF, BSC  
Command Clinical Psychologist  
Directorate of Investigative Support

Atch  
Research Proposal

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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**Coordination:** In addition to making team and working group selection, there will be requirements for a variety of essential arrangements. These will include scheduling and arranging meetings, nominating cases for study, obtaining grants of immunity (and authorization for anonymity of subjects's associates), contacting prospective subjects to determine their voluntariness, and arranging for interviews of subjects and their former associates.

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**Funds:** The primary expenditure is anticipated to arise from travel expenses required for meetings and interviews. Additional costs may be incurred if members of the team or working group are contractual employees. Further, consideration ought to be given to compensating subjects' former associates for their time if they are not in governmental employment. Due to the variability of these factors, an estimate of expenses is difficult. Nonetheless, Phase I would be expected to cost approximately ten thousand dollars and Phase II, twenty-five thousand dollars. More precise estimates per interview for Phase III should be established by completion of Phase II. The first year of this study is therefore estimated to cost approximately 35 thousand dollars.